WARNINGS
Warnings do no harm and might do
inexpressible good
- 27 January 1941, Dr. Ricardo Shreiber,
the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told Max Bishop, third
secretary of the US embassy that he had just learned
from his intelligence sources that there was a war
plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
This information was sent to the State Department
and Naval Intelligence and to Admiral Kimmel at
Hawaii.
- 31 March 1941 - A Navy report by
Bellinger and Martin predicted that if Japan made
war on the US, they would strike Pearl Harbor
without warning at dawn with aircraft from a maximum
of 6 carriers. For years Navy planners had assumed
that Japan, on the outbreak of war, would strike the
American fleet wherever it was. The fleet was the
only threat to Japan's plans. Logically, Japan
couldn't engage in any major operation with the
American fleet on its flank. The strategic options
for the Japanese were not unlimited.
- 10 July - US Military Attache
Smith-Hutton at Tokyo reported Japanese Navy
secretly practicing aircraft torpedo attacks against
capital ships in Ariake Bay. The bay closely
resembles Pearl Harbor.
- July - The US Military Attache in Mexico
forwarded a report that the Japanese were
constructing special small submarines for attacking
the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a
training program then under way included towing them
from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands,
where they practiced surfacing and submerging.
- 10 August 1941, the top British agent,
code named "Tricycle", Dusko Popov, told the FBI of
the planned attack on Pearl Harbor and that it would
be soon. The FBI told him that his information was
"too precise, too complete to be believed. The
questionnaire plus the other information you brought
spell out in detail exactly where, when, how, and by
whom we are to be attacked. If anything, it sounds
like a trap." He also reported that a senior
Japanese naval person had gone to Taranto to collect
all secret data on the attack there and that it was
of utmost importance to them. The info was given to
Naval IQ.
- Early in the Fall, Kilsoo Haan, an agent
for the Sino-Korean People's League, told Eric
Severeid of CBS that the Korean underground in Korea
and Japan had positive proof that the Japanese were
going to attack Pearl Harbor before Christmas. Among
other things, one Korean had actually seen the
plans. In late October, Haan finally convinced US
Senator Guy Gillette that the Japanese were planning
to attack in December or January. Gillette alerted
the State Department, Army and Navy Intelligence and
FDR personally.
- 24 September 1941, the " bomb plot"
message in J-19 code from Japan Naval Intelligence
to Japan' s consul general in Honolulu requesting
grid of exact locations of ships pinpointed for the
benefit of bombardiers and torpedo pilots was
deciphered. There was no reason to know the EXACT
location of ships in harbor, unless to attack them -
it was a dead giveaway. Chief of War Plans Turner
and Chief of Naval Operations Stark repeatedly kept
it and warnings based on it prepared by Safford and
others from being passed to Hawaii. The chief of
Naval Intelligence Captain Kirk was replaced because
he insisted on warning HI. It was lack of
information like this that lead to the exoneration
of the Hawaii commanders and the blaming of
Washington for unpreparedness for the attack by the
Army Board and Navy Court. At no time did the
Japanese ever ask for a similar bomb plot for any
other American military installation. Why the
Roosevelt administration allowed flagrant Japanese
spying on PH has never been explained, but they
blocked 2 Congressional investigations in the fall
of 1941 to allow it to continue. The bomb plots were
addressed to "Chief of 3rd Bureau, Naval General
Staff", marked Secret Intelligence message,
and given special serial numbers, so their
significance couldn't be missed. There were about 95
ships in port. The text was:
"Strictly secret.
"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels
along the following lines insofar as possible:
"1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five
subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you
like.)
"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
"Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island.
(This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
"Area C. East Loch.
"Area D. Middle Loch.
"Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.
"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have
you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at
wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If
possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when
there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)"
- Simple traffic analysis of the accelerated
frequency of messages from various Japanese consuls
gave a another identification of war preparations,
from Aug-Dec there were 6 messages from Seattle, 18
from Panama, 55 from Manila and 68 from Hawaii.
- Oct. - Soviet top spy Richard Sorge, the
greatest spy in history, informed Kremlin that Pearl
Harbor would be attacked within 60 days. Moscow
informed him that this was passed to the US.
Interestingly, all references to Pearl Harbor in the
War Department's copy of Sorge's 32,000 word
confession to the Japanese were deleted. NY Daily
News, 17 May 1951.
- 16 Oct. - FDR grossly humiliated Japan's
Ambassador and refused to meet with Premier Konoye
to engineer the war party, lead by General Tojo,
into power in Japan.
- 1 Nov. - JN-25 Order to continue drills
against anchored capital ships to prepare to "ambush
and completely destroy the US enemy." The message
included references to armor-piercing bombs and
'near surface torpedoes.'
- 13 Nov. - The German Ambassador to US,
Dr. Thomsen an anti-Nazi, told US IQ that Pearl
Harbor would be attacked.
- 14 Nov. - Japanese Merchant Marine was
alerted that wartime recognition signals would be in
effect Dec 1.
- 22 Nov. - Tokyo said to Ambassador Nomura
in Washington about extending the deadline for
negotiations to November 29: "...this time we mean
it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed.
After that things are automatically going to
happen."
- CIA Director Allen Dulles told people that US
was warned in mid-November that the Japanese Fleet
had sailed east past Tokyo Bay and was going to
attack Pearl Harbor. CIA FOIA
- 23 Nov. - JN25 order - "The first air
attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-day." (Tokyo
time or 8 A.M. Honolulu time)
- 25 Nov. - British decrypted the Winds
setup message sent Nov. 19. The US decoded it Nov.
28. It was a J-19 Code message that there would be
an attack and that the signal would come over Radio
Tokyo as a weather report - rain meaning war, east
(Higashi) meaning US.
- 25 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson noted
in his diary "FDR stated that we were likely to be
attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday." FDR asked:
"the question was how we should maneuver them into
the position of firing the first shot without too
much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk
involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the
first shot, we realized that in order to have the
full support of the American people it was desirable
to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do
this so that there should remain no doubt in
anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors."
- 25 Nov. - Navy Department ordered all US
trans-Pacific shipping to take the southern route.
PHH 12:317 (PHH = 1946 Congressional Report, vol.
12, page 317) ADM Turner testified "We sent the
traffic down to the Torres Straight, so that the
track of the Japanese task force would be clear of
any traffic." PHH 4:1942
- 25 Nov. - Yamamoto radioed this order in
JN-25: " (a) The task force, keeping its movements
strictly secret and maintaining close guard against
submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian
waters and upon the very opening of hostilities,
shall attack the main force of the United States
Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The raid
is planned for dawn on X-day -- exact date to be
given by later order. (b) Should the negotiations
with the US prove successful, the task force shall
hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and
reassemble. (c) The task force will move out of
Hitokappu Wan on the morning of 26 November and
advance to the standing-by position on the afternoon
of 4 December and speedily complete refueling." (
Order to sail - scan from the PHA Congressional
Hearings Report, vol 1 p 180, transcript p 437-8)
This was decoded by the British on November 25 and
the Dutch on November 27. When it was decoded by the
US is a national secret, however, on November 26
Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of
units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready
for offensive action.
- 26 Nov. 3 A.M. - Churchill sent an urgent
secret message to FDR, probably containing above
message. This message caused the greatest agitation
in DC. Of Churchill's voluminous correspondence with
FDR, this is the only message that has not been
released (on the grounds that it would damage
national security). Stark testified that "On
November 26 there was received specific evidence of
the Japanese intention to wage offensive war against
Great Britain and the United States." C.I.A.
Director William Casey, who was in the OSS in 1941,
in his book THE SECRET WAR AGAINST HITLER, p 7,
wrote "The British had sent word that a Japanese
fleet was steaming east toward Hawaii." Washington,
in an order of Nov 26 as a result of the "first
shot" meeting the day before, ordered both US
aircraft carriers, the Enterprise and the Lexington
out of Pearl Harbor "as soon as practicable." This
order included stripping Pearl of 50 planes or 40
percent of its already inadequate fighter
protection. In response to Churchill's message, FDR
secretly cabled him that afternoon - "Negotiations
off. Services expect action within two weeks." Note
that the only way FDR could have linked negotiations
with service action, let alone have known the timing
of the action, was if he had the message to sail. In
other words, the only service action contingent on
negotiations was Pearl Harbor.
- 26 Nov. - the "most fateful document "
was
Hull's ultimatum that Japan must withdraw from
Indochina and all China. FDR's Ambassador to Japan
called this "The document that touched the button
that started the war."
- 27 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson sent a
confused and confusing
hostile action possible or DO-DON'T warning. The
Navy Court found this message directed attention
away from Pearl Harbor, rather than toward it. One
purpose of the message was to mislead HI into
believing negotiations were continuing. The Army
which could not do reconnaissance was ordered to and
the Navy which could was ordered not to. The Army
was ordered on sabotage alert, which specifically
precluded attention to outside threat. Navy
attention was misdirected 5000 miles from HI. DC
repeated, no less than three times as a direct
instruction of the President, "The US desires that
Japan commit the first overt act Period." It was
unusual that FDR directed this warning, a routine
matter, to Hawaii which is proof that he knew other
warnings were not sent. A simple question--what
Japanese "overt act" was FDR expecting at Pearl
Harbor? He ordered sabotage prevented and subs
couldn't enter, that leaves air attack. The words
"overt act" disclose FDR's intent - not just that
Japan be allowed to attack but that they inflict
damage on the fleet. This FDR order to allow a
Japanese attack was aid to the enemy - explicit
treason.
- 29 Nov.- Hull sat in Layfayette Park
across from the White House with ace United Press
reporter Joe Leib and showed him a message stating
that Pearl Harbor would be attacked on December 7.
This could well have been the Nov. 26 message from
Churchill. The New York Times in its 12/8/41 PH
report on page 13 under the headline "Attack Was
Expected" stated the US had known that Pearl Harbor
was going to be attacked the week before. Perhaps
Leib wasn't the only reporter Hull told.
- 29 Nov. - The FBI embassy tap made an
intercept of an uncoded plain-text Japanese
telephone conversation in which an Embassy
functionary (Kurusu) asked 'Tell me, what zero hour
is. Otherwise, I won't be able to carry on
diplomacy.' The voice from Tokyo (K. Yamamoto) said
softly, 'Well then, I will tell you. Zero hour is
December 8 (Tokyo time, ie, December 7 US time) at
Pearl Harbor.' (US Navy translation 29 Nov)
- 30 Nov. US Time (or 1 Dec. Tokyo time) -
The Japanese fleet was radioed this Imperial Naval
Order (JN-25): "JAPAN, UNDER THE NECESSITY OF HER
SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DEFENSE, HAS REACHED A
POSITION TO DECLARE WAR ON
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA." (Congress
Appendix D, p 415). US ally China also recovered it
in plain text from a shot-down Japanese Army plane
near Canton that evening. This caused an emergency
Imperial Conference because they knew the Chinese
would give the information to GB and US. In a
related J-19 message the next day, the US translated
elaborate instructions from Japan dealing in precise
detail with the method of internment of American and
British nationals in Asia "on the outbreak of war
with England and the United States"
- 1 Dec. - Office of Naval Intelligence,
ONI, Twelfth Naval District in San Francisco found
the missing Japanese fleet by correlating reports
from the four wireless news services and several
shipping companies that they were getting strange
signals west of Hawaii. The Soviet Union also knew
the exact location of the Japanese fleet because
they asked the Japanese in advance to let one of
their ships pass (Layton p 261). This info was most
likely given to them by US because Sorge's spy ring
was rolled up November 14. All long-range PBY
patrols from the Aleutians were ordered stopped on
Dec 6 to prevent contact.
- 1 Dec. - Foreign Minister Togo cabled
Washington Ambassador Nomura to continue
negotiations "to prevent the U.S. from becoming
unduly suspicious."
- 1 Dec. - The tanker Shiriya, which
had been added to the Striking Force in an order
intercepted Nov 14, radioed "proceeding to a
position 30.00 N, 154.20 E. Expect to arrive at that
point on 3 December." (near HI) The fact that this
message is in the National Archives destroys the
myth that the attack fleet maintained radio silence.
They were not ordered to (Order 820). Serial numbers
prove that the Striking Force sent over 663 radio
messages between Nov 16 and Dec 7 or about 1 per
hour. The NSA has not released any raw intercepts
because the headers would prove that the Striking
Force did not maintain radio silence. On Nov 29 the
Hiyei sent one message to the Commander of the 3rd
fleet; on Nov 30 the Akagi sent several messages to
its tankers - see page 474 of the
Hewitt Report. Stinnett in DAY OF DECEIT (p 209)
found over 100 messages from the Striking Force in
the National Archives. All Direction Finding reports
from HI have been crudely cut out. Reports from Dec
5 show messages sent from the Striking Force picked
up by Station Cast, P.I.
- From traffic analysis,
HI reported that the carrier force was at sea and in
the North. THE MOST AMAZING FACT is that in reply to
that report, MacArthur's command sent a series of
three messages, Nov 26, 29, Dec 2, to HI lying about
the location of the carrier fleet - saying it was in
the South China Sea. This false information, which
the NSA calls inexplicable, was the true reason that
HI was caught unawares. Duane Whitlock, who is
still alive in Iowa, sent those messages.
- There were a large number of other messages that
gave the location of the Striking Force by alluding
to the Aleutians, the North Pacific and various
weather systems near HI.
- 1 Dec. - FDR cut short his scheduled ten
day vacation after 1 day to meet with Hull and
Stark. The result of this meeting was reported on 2
Dec. by the Washington Post: "President Roosevelt
yesterday assumed direct command of diplomatic and
military moves relating to Japan." This politically
damaging move was necessary to prevent the mutiny of
conspirators.
- 1 Dec. 3:30 P.M. FDR read Foreign
Minister Togo's message to his ambassador to
Germany: "Say very secretly to them that there is
extreme danger between Japan & Anglo-Saxon nations
through some clash of arms, add that the time of
this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." This
was in response to extreme German pressure on
November 29 for Japan to strike the US and promises
to join with Japan in war against the US. The second
of its three parts has never been released. The
message says it contains the plan of campaign. This
is 1 of only 3 known DIPLOMATIC intercepts that
specified PH as target. It was so interesting, FDR
kept a copy.
- 2 Dec. 2200 Tokyo time- Here is a typical
JN-25 ships-in-harbor report sent to attack fleet,
words in parenthesis were in the original: "Striking
Force telegram No. 994. Two battleships (Oklahoma,
Nevada), 1 aircraft carrier (Enterprise) 2 heavy
cruisers, 12 destroyers sailed. The force that
sailed on 22 November returned to port. Ships at
anchor Pearl Harbor p.m. 28 November were 6
battleships (2 Maryland class, 2 California class, 2
Pennsylvania class), 1 aircraft carrier (Lexington),
9 heavy cruisers (5 San Francisco class, 3 Chicago
class, 1 Salt Lake class), 5 light cruisers (4
Honolulu class, 1 Omaha class)"
- 2 Dec. - Commander of the Combined
Imperial Fleet Yamamoto radioed the attack fleet in
plain (uncoded) Japanese
Climb Niitakayama 1208 (Dec 8 Japanese time, Dec
7 our time). Thus the US knew EXACTLY when the war
would start. Mount Niitaka was the highest mountain
in the Japanese Empire - 13,113 feet.
- 2 Dec. - General Hein Ter Poorten, the
commander of the Netherlands East Indies Army gave
the Winds setup message to the US War Department.
The Australians had a center in Melbourne and the
Chinese also broke JN-25. A Dutch sub had visually
tracked the attack fleet to the Kurile Islands in
early November and this info was passed to DC, but
DC did not give it to HI. The intercepts the Dutch
gave the US are still classified in RG 38, Box 792.
- 2 Dec - Japanese order No. 902 specified
that old JN-25 additive tables version 7 would
continue to be used alongside version 8 when the
latter was introduced on December 4. This means the
US read all messages to the Striking Force through
the attack.
- 4 Dec. - In the early hours, Ralph Briggs
at the Navy's East Coast Intercept station, received
the "East Winds, Rain" message, the Winds Execute,
which meant war. He put it on the TWX circuit
immediately and called his commander. This message
was deleted from the files. One of the main coverups
of Pearl Harbor was to make this message disappear.
Japanese Dispatch # 7001. In response to the Winds
Execute, the Office of US Naval IQ had all Far
Eastern stations (Hawaii not informed) destroy their
codes and classified documents including the Tokyo
Embassy.
- 4 Dec. - The Dutch invoked the ADB joint
defense agreement when the Japanese crossed the
magic line of 100 East and 10 North. The U.S. was at
war with Japan 3 days before they were at war with
us.
- 4 Dec. - General Ter Poorten sent all the
details of the Winds Execute command to Colonel
Weijerman, the Dutch military attache' in Washington
to pass on to the highest military circles.
Weijerman personally gave it to Marshall, Chief of
Staff of the War Department.
- 4 Dec - US General Thorpe at Java sent
four messages warning of the PH attack. DC ordered
him to stop sending warnings.
- 5 Dec. - All Japanese international
shipping had returned to home port.
- 5 December - In the morning FDR dictated a
letter to Wendell Wilkie for the Australian Prime
Minister, "There is always the Japanese to consider.
The situation is definitely serious and there might
be an armed clash at any moment...Perhaps the next
four or five days will decide the matters."
- 5 Dec. - At a Cabinet meeting, Secretary
of the Navy Knox said, "Well, you know Mr.
President, we know where the Japanese fleet is?"
"Yes, I know" said FDR. " I think we ought to tell
everybody just how ticklish the situation is. We
have information as Knox just mentioned...Well, you
tell them what it is, Frank." Knox became very
excited and said, "Well, we have very secret
information that the Japanese fleet is out at sea.
Our information is..." and then a scowling FDR cut
him off. (Infamy, Toland, 1982, ch 14 sec 5)
- 5 Dec. - Washington Star reporter
Constantine Brown quotes a friend in his book The
Coming of the Whirlwind p 291, "This is it! The
Japs are ready to attack. We've broken their code,
and we've read their ORDERS."
- 5 Dec. - Lt. Howard Brown of Station Cast
in the Philippines received urgent request from
Washington to listen for a short message from Tokyo
which ended with the English word "stop". He heard
the message at 11:30 PM Hawaiian time Dec 6. This is
the Hidden Word Code set up in a message of November
27 (e.g. in code, Roosevelt=Miss Kimiko). The
message was: "Relations between Japan and the
following countries are on the brink of catastrophe:
Britain and the United States."
- 6 December - This 18 November J19 message
was translated by the Army:
"1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th
were as I told you in my No.219 on that day. Area A
-- A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and
one tanker left port. Area C -- 3 warships of the
heavy cruiser class were at anchor. 2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in harbor. The
carrier Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area
C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of
the Pensacola class were tied up at docks 'KS'. 4
merchant vessels were at anchor in area D. 3. At 10:00 A.M. on the morning of the 17th, 8
destroyers were observed entering the Harbor..." Of
course this information was not passed to HI.
- 6 Dec. - A Dec 2 request from Tokyo to HI
for information about the absence of barrage
balloons, anti-torpedo nets and air recon was
translated by the Army.
- 6 Dec. - at 9:30 P.M FDR read the first
13 parts of the decoded Japanese diplomatic
declaration of war and said "This means war." What
kind of President would do nothing? When he returned
to his 34 dinner guests he said, "The war starts
tomorrow."
- 6 Dec. - the war cabinet: FDR, top
advisor Hopkins, Stimson, Marshall, Secretary of the
Navy Knox, with aides John McCrea and Frank Beatty
"deliberately sat through the night of 6 December
1941 waiting for the Japs to strike." (Infamy
ch 16 sec 2)
- 7 December - A message from the Japanese
Consul in Budapest to Tokyo:
"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the
Government of this country a British Government
communique to the effect that a state of war would
break out on the 7th." The communique was the Dec
5th War Alert from the British Admiralty. It
has disappeared. This triple priority alert was
delivered to FDR personally. The Mid-East British
Air Marshall told Col. Bonner Fellers on Saturday
that he had received a secret signal that America
was coming into the war in 24 hours. Churchill
summarized the message in GRAND ALLIANCE page 601 as
listing the two fleets attacking British targets and
"Other Japanese fleets...also at sea on other
tasks." There only were three other fleets- for
Guam, the Philippines and HI. 2 paragraphs of the
alert, British targets only, are printed in AT DAWN
WE SLEPT, Prange, p 464. There is no innocent
purpose for our government to hide this document.
- 7 December 1941 very early Washington
time, there were two Marines, an emergency special
detail, stationed outside the Japanese Naval
Attache's door. 9:30 AM Aides begged Stark to send a
warning to Hawaii. He did not. 10 AM FDR read the
14th part, 11 A.M. FDR read the 15th part setting
the time for the declaration of war to be delivered
to the State Department at 1 PM, about dawn Pearl
Harbor time, and did nothing. Navy Secretary Knox
was given the 15th part at 11:15 A.M. with this note
from the Office of Naval IQ: "This means a sunrise
attack on Pearl Harbor today." Naval IQ also
transmitted this prediction to Hull and about 8
others, including the White House (PHH 36:532). At
10:30 AM Bratton informed Marshall that he had a
most important message (the 15th part) and would
bring it to Marshall's quarters but Marshall said he
would take it at his office. At 11:25 Marshall
reached his office according to Bratton. Marshall
testified that he had been riding horses that
morning but he was contradicted by Harrison,
McCollum, and Deane. Marshall who had read the first
13 parts by 10 PM the prior night, perjured himself
by denying that he had even received them. Marshall,
in the face of his aides' urgent supplications that
he warn Hawaii, made strange delays including
reading and re-reading all of the 10 minute long
14 Part Message (and some parts several times)
which took an hour and refused to use the scrambler
phone on his desk, refused to send a warning by the
fast, more secure Navy system but sent Bratton three
times to inquire how long it would take to send his
watered down warning - when informed it would take
30 or 40 minutes by Army radio, he was satisfied
(that meant he had delayed enough so the warning
wouldn't reach Pearl Harbor until after the 1 PM
Washington time deadline). The warning was in fact
sent commercial without priority identification and
arrived 6 hours late. This message reached all other
addressees, like the Philippines and Canal Zone, in
a timely manner.
- 7 December - 7:55 A.M. Hawaii time AIR
RAID PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NOT DRILL.
- 7 December - 1:50 P.M. Washington time.
Harry Hopkins, who was the only person with FDR when
he received the news of the attack by telephone from
Knox, wrote that FDR was unsurprised and expressed
"great relief." Eleanor Roosevelt wrote about
December 7th in This I Remember p 233, that
FDR became "in a way more serene." In the NY Times
Magazine of October 8, 1944 she wrote: "December 7
was...far from the shock it proved to the country in
general. We had expected something of the sort for a
long time."
- 7 December - 3:00 PM "The (war cabinet)
conference met in not too tense an atmosphere
because I think that all of us believed that in the
last analysis the enemy was Hitler...and that Japan
had given us an opportunity." Harry Hopkins (top KGB
agent and FDR's alter ego), Dec. 7 Memo (Roosevelt
and Hopkins R Sherwood, p. 431)
- 7 December - 9 hours later, MacArthur's
entire air force was caught by surprise and wiped
out in the Philippines. His reaction to the news of
Pearl Harbor was quite unusual - he locked himself
in his room all morning and refused to meet with his
air commander General Brereton, and refused to
attack Japanese forces on Formosa even under orders
from the War Department. MacArthur gave three
conflicting orders that ensured the planes were on
the ground most of the morning. MacArthur used radar
tracking of the Japanese planes at 140, 100, 80, 60,
down to 20 miles to time his final order and ensure
his planes were on the ground. Strategically, the
destruction of half of all US heavy bombers in the
world was more important than naval damage in Pearl
Harbor. Either MacArthur had committed the greatest
blunder in military history or he was under orders
to allow his forces to be destroyed. If it were the
greatest blunder in history, it is remarkable how he
escaped any reprimand, kept his command and got his
fourth star and Congressional Medal of Honor shortly
later. Prange argued, "How could the President
ensure a successful Japanese attack unless he
confided in the commanders and persuaded them to
allow the enemy to proceed unhindered?"
- 7 December - 8:30 PM, FDR said to his
cabinet, "We have reason to believe that the Germans
have told the Japanese that if Japan declares war,
they will too. In other words, a declaration of war
by Japan automatically brings..." at which point he
was interrupted, but his expectation and focus is
clear. Mrs. Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor,
observed later about FDR: "I had a deep emotional
feeling that something was wrong, that this
situation was not all it appeared to be." Mrs.
Perkins was obsessed by Roosevelt's strange
reactions that night and remarked particularly on
the expression he had:" In other words, there have
been times when I associated that expression with a
kind of evasiveness."
- FDR met with CBS newsman Edward R. Murrow at
midnight. Murrow, who had seen many statesmen in
crises, was surprised at FDR's calm reaction. After
chatting about London, they reviewed the latest news
from PH and then FDR tested Murrow's news instincts
with these 2 bizarre giveaway questions: "Did this
surprise you?" Murrow said yes. FDR: "Maybe you
think it didn't surprise us?" FDR gave the
impression that the attack itself was not unwelcome.
This is the same high-strung FDR that got polio when
convicted of perjury; the same FDR that was
bedridden for a month when he learned Russia was to
be attacked; the same FDR who couldn't eat or drink
when he got the Japanese order to sail.
- 8 December - In a conversation with his
speech writer Rosenman, FDR "emphasized that Hitler
was still the first target, but he feared that a
great many Americans would insist that we make the
war in the Pacific at least equally important with
the war against Hitler."
- Later, Jonathan Daniels, administrative
assistant and press secretary to FDR said, "The blow
was heavier than he had hoped it would necessarily
be...But the risks paid off; even the loss was worth
the price..."
- FDR reminisced with Stalin at Tehran on November
30, 1943, saying "if the Japanese had not attacked
the US he doubted very much if it would have been
possible to send any American forces to Europe."
Compare this statement with what FDR said at the
Atlantic Conference 4 months before Pearl:
"Everything was to be done to force an 'incident' to
justify hostilities." Given that a Japanese attack
was the only possible incident, then FDR had said he
would do it.
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